The goal of the recommender system is to facilitate social learning about a product based on the experimentation by early users of the product. Without appropriating their social contribution, however, early users may lack the incentives to experiment on a product, and the presence of a fully transparent social learning can only worsen this incentive problem. The associated "cold start" could then result in a demise of a potentially valuable product and a collapse of the social learning via a recommender system. This paper studies design of the optimal recommender system focusing on this incentive problem and the pattern of dynamic social learning that emerges from the recommender system. The optimal design trades off fully transparent social learning to improve incentives for early experimentation, by selectively over-recommending a product in the early phase of the product release. The over-recommedation "siphons" strict incentives users have for consumption in the event of a good news (on the product privately observed by the designer) to the situation in which no such good news has arrived, thereby encouraging users to experiment on the product to a degree they would not with the fully transparent recommender system. Under the optimal scheme, experimentation occurs faster than under full transparency but slower than under the first-best optimum, and the rate of experimentation increases over an initial phase and lasts until the posterior becomes sufficiently bad in which case the recommendation stops along with experimentation on the product. Fully transparent recommendation may become optimal if the (socially-benevolent) designer faces an additional informational problem, say arising from the heterogeneity of users' experimentation costs.
Introduction
Most of our choices rely on recommendations. Whether it is for picking movies or stocks, choosing hotels or buying online, ratings play an important role. Internet search engines such as Google, Microsoft and Yahoo, and online retail platforms such as Amazon, and Netflix make referrals to the consumers by ranking search items in the relevance order, by providing consumer reviews and by making movie recommendations. To the extent that much of this information is collected from other users and consumers, often based on their past experiences, the services these firms provide are essentially supervised social learning. As evidenced by the success of these firms, a significant benefit can be harnessed from social learning: What consumers with similar consumption histories have done in the past and how they feel about their experiences tells both a consumer and the firm a lot about what a consumer may want -often much more than her demographic profile can tell.
While much has been studied on social learning, the past literature has focused primarily on its positive aspect, for instance whether observational learning will yield complete revelation of the underlying state . A normative market design perspective -how to optimally supervise consumers both to engage in experimenting with new product and to inform about their experiences to others -has been lacking. In particular, how to incentivize consumers to experiment with new products through social learning is an important issue that has not received much attention so far. Indeed, the most challenging aspect of supervised social learning is the incentivizing of information acquisition. Often, the items that would benefit most from social learning -books and movies that are ex ante unappealing to mainstream consumers -are precisely those that individuals lack private incentives to experiment with (due to the lack of ex ante mainstream appeal). Motivating consumers to engage in experiment is difficult enough even without the presence of social learning. The availability of social learning makes it even more difficult: Even those individuals who would engage in costly information acquisition absent social learning would now rather free ride on information that others provide. 1 In other words, the availability of a well-functioning recommendation system may in fact crowd out the information production, thus undermining the foundation of the recommendation system as well.
The current paper explores the optimal mechanism for achieving this dual purpose of the recommender system. In keeping with the realism, we focus on the non-monetary tools for achieving them. Indeed, the monetary transfers are seldom used for motivating the experimentation, and/because they are ineffective. It is difficult to tell whether a reviewer performs experimentation conscientiously or submits an unbiased review, and cannot be guaranteed by monetary incentives.
2 Instead, our key insight is that incentives for information acqui-sition can be best provided by the judicious use of the recommendation system itself. To fix an idea, suppose the recommender system, say an online movie platform, recommends a user movies that she will truly enjoy based on the reviews by the past users -call this truthful recommendation -for the most part, but mixes with recommending to her some new movie that needs experimenting -call this fake recommendation. As long as the platform keeps the users informed about whether recommendation is truthful or fake and as long as it commits not to make too many fake recommendations, users will happily follow the recommendation and in the process perform the necessary experimentation. This idea of distorting recommendation toward experimentation is consistent with the casual observation that ratings of many products appear to be inflated. Indeed, Google is known to periodically shuffle its ranking of search items to give a better chance to relatively new unknown sites, lest too little information on them would accumulate. Netflix recommends a movie with some noise intentionally. One obvious explanation for this ubiquitous phenomenon lies in the divergence between the recommender's (usually, the seller's) interests, and the consumers, and there is ample evidence that in many cases this conflict of interest leads to exaggerated recommendations. But we show that the inflated ratings can be a result of optimal supervision of social learning organized by a benevolent designer.
Of course, the extent to which information acquisition can be motivated in this way depends on the agent's cost of acquiring information, and the frequency with which the platform provides truthful recommendation (as opposed to fake recommendation). Also important is the dynamics of how the platform mixes truthful recommendation with the fake recommendation over time after the initial release of the product (e..g, movie release date). For instance, for an ex ante unappealing product, it is unlikely for many users even with low cost of experimentation to have experienced it immediately after its release, so recommending such a product in the early stage is likely to be met with skepticism. To be credible, therefore, the platform must commit to truthful recommendation with sufficiently high probability in the early stage of the product life, meaning that not much recommendation will be made on such a product and the learning will be slow in the early stage; but over time, recommendation becomes credible so learning will speed up. This suggests that there will be a nontrivial dynamics in the optimal recommendation strategy as well as social learning.
The current paper seeks to explore how a recommendation mechanism optimally balances the tradeoff between experimentation and learning, and what kind of learning dynamics such a mechanism would entail and what implications they will have on the welfare, particularly when compared with the (i) no recommendation benchmark (where there is no platform supervision of learning) and the (ii) truthful recommendation (where the platform commits to always recommend truthfully). We tackle these issues by considering a platform that maximizes social welfare and the one maximizing profit, and one who can commit to the recommendation strategies and the one that lacks such a commitment power. The different scenarios capture a variety of relevant environments. For instance, social welfare maximization could result from a Bertrand type competition.
Our starting point is the standard "workhorse" model of experimentation, borrowed from Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) . The designer provides a good to agents whose binary value is unknown. By consuming this good, a possibly costly choice, short-run agents might find out whether the value is high or not. Here, we are not interested in the incentives of agents to report truthfully or not their experience to the designer: because they consume this good only once, they are willing to do so. But while agents do not mind reporting their experience, their decision to consume the good or not does not account for the benefits of experimentation. Importantly, agents do not communicate to each other directly. The designer mediates the information transmission. This gives rise to a difficult problem for this principal. How should this information be structured so as to yield the right amount of experimentation?
Our model can also be viewed as introducing design into the standard model of social learning (hence the title). In standard models (for instance, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welsch, 1992; Banerjee, 1993) , the sequence of agents take decisions myopically, ignoring the impact of their action on learning and future decisions and welfare. Here instead, the interaction between consecutive agents is mediated by the designer, who controls the flow of information. Such dynamic control is present in Gershkov and Szentes (2009), but that paper considers a very different environment, as there are direct payoff externalities (voting). Much closer is a recent working paper of Kremer, Mansour and Perry (2012). There, however, learning is trivial: the quality of the good is ascertained as soon as a single consumer buys it. Finally, a theme that is common to our analysis and a variety of strategic contexts lies in the benefit of sowing doubt, or uncertainty in the agents' information. See Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1995) for a general analysis in the case of repeated games with incomplete information, and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) for a more recent application to optimal persuasion problem. The current paper can be seen as a dynamic version of the persuasion mechanism design. 3 
Model
A product, say a "movie," is released at time t = 0, and, for each continuous time t ≥ 0, a constant flow of unit mass of consumers arrive, having the chance to consume the product, i.e., watch the movie. In the baseline model, the consumers are short-lived, so they make one time decisions, and leave the market for good. (We later extend the model to allow them to delay their decision to watch the movie until after further information becomes available.) A consumer incurs the cost c ∈ (0, 1) for watching the movie. The cost can be the opportunity cost of the time spent, or the price charged, for the movie. The movie is either "good," in which case a consumer derives the surplus of 1, or "bad," in which case the consumer derives surplus of 0. The quality of the movie is a priori uncertain but may be revealed over time. At time t = 0, the probability of the movie being good, or simply "the prior," is p 0 . We shall consider all values of the prior, although the most interesting case will be p 0 ∈ (0, c), so consumers would not consume given the prior.
Consumers do not observe the decisions and experiences by previous consumers. There is a designer who can mediate social learning by collecting information from previous consumers and disclosing that information to the current consumers. We can think of the designer as an Internet platform, such as Netflix, Google or Microsoft, who have access to users' activities and reviews, and based on this information, provide search guide and product recommendation to future users. As is natural with these examples, the designer may obtain information from its own marketing research or other sources, but importantly from the consumers' experiences themselves. For instance, there may be some flow of "fans" who try out the good at zero cost. We thus assume that some information arrives at a constant base rate ρ > 0 plus the rate at which consumers experience the good. Specifically, if a flow of size µ consumes the good over some time interval [t, t + dt), then the designer learns during this time interval that the movie is "good" with probability λ g (ρ + µ)dt, that it is "bad" with probability λ b (ρ + µ)dt, where λ g , λ b ≥ 0, and ρ is the rate at which the designer obtains the information regardless of the consumers' behavior. The designer starts with the same prior p 0 , and the consumers do not have access to the "free" learning.
The designer provides feedback on the movie to the consumers at each time, based on the information she has learnt so far. Since the decision for the consumers are binary, without loss, the designer simply decides whether to recommend the movie or not. The designer commits to a policy of recommendation to the consumers: Specifically, at time t, she recommends the movie to a fraction k t ∈ [0, 1] of consumers if she learns the movie to be good, a fraction β t ∈ [0, 1] if she learns it to be bad, and α t ∈ [0, 1] when she has received no news by t. We assume that the designer maximizes the intertemporal net surplus of the consumers, discounted at rate r > 0, over (measurable) functions (k t , β t , α t ).
The information possessed by the designer at time t ≥ 0 is succinctly summarized by the designer's belief, which is either 1 in case the good news has arrived, 0 in case the bad news has arrived by that time, or some p t ∈ [0, 1] in the event of no news having arrived by that time. The "no news" posterior, or simply posterior p t must evolve according to Bayes rule. Specifically, suppose for time interval [t, t + dt), there is a a flow of experimentation at the rate µ t = ρ + α t , which consists of the "free" learning rate ρ and the flow size α t of the agents who consume the good during the period. Suppose no news has arrived until t + dt, then the designer's updated posterior at time t + dt must be
.
Rearranging and simplifying, the posterior must follow the law of motion:
with the initial value at t = 0 given by the prior p 0 . It is worth noting that the evolution of the posterior depends on the relative speed of the good news arrival versus the bad news arrival. If λ g > λ b (so the good news arrive faster than the bad news), then "no news" leads the designer to form a pessimistic inference by on the quality of the movie, with the posterior falling. By contrast, if λ g < λ b , then "no news" leads to on optimistic inference, with the posterior rising. Both cases are descriptive of different products..... [Examples.] We label the former case good news case and the latter bad news case. (Note that the former case includes the special case of λ b = 0, a pure good news case, and the latter includes λ g = 0, a pure bad news case.)
In our model, the consumers do not directly observe the designer's information, or her belief. They can form a rational belief, however, on the designer's belief. Let g t and b t denote the probability that the designer's belief is 1 and 0, respectively. Just as the designer's belief evolves, the consumers' belief on the designer's belief evolves as well, depending on the rate at which the agents (are induced to) experiment. Specifically, given the experimentation rate µ t ,ġ
with the initial value g 0 = 0, anḋ
4 Subtracting p t from both sides and rearranging, we get dp
where o(dt) is a term such that o(dt)/dt → 0 as dt → 0.
with the initial value b 0 = 0. 5 Further, these beliefs must form a martingale:
The designer chooses the policy (α, β, k), measurable, to maximize social welfare, namely
where (p t , g t , b t ) must follow the required laws of motion: (1), (2), (3), and (4), where µ t = ρ + α t is the total experimentation rate and r is the discount rate of the designer.
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In addition, for the policy (α, β, k) to be implementable, there must be an incentive on the part of the agents to follow the recommendation. Given policy (α, β, k), conditional on being recommended to watch the movie, the consumer will have the incentive to watch the movie, if and only if the expected quality of the movie-the posterior that it is good-is no less than the cost:
Since the agents do not directly access the news arriving to the designer, so the exact circumstances of the recommendation-whether the agents are recommended because of good news or despite no news-is kept hidden, which is why the incentives for following the recommendation is based on the posterior formed by the agents on the information of the designer. (There is also an incentive constraint for the agents not to consume the good when not recommended by the designer. Since this constraint will not bind throughout, as the designer typically desires more experimentation than the agents, we shall ignore it.)
Our goal is to characterize the optimal policy of the designer and the pattern of social learning it induces. To facilitate this characterization, it is useful to consider three benchmarks.
• No Social Learning (NSL): In this regime, the consumers receive no information 5 These formulae are derived as follows. Suppose the probability that the designer has seen the good news by time t and the probability that she has seen the bad news by t are respectively g t and b t . Then, the probability of the good news arriving by time t + dt and the probability of the bad news arriving by time t + dt are respectively
Dividing these equations by dt and taking the limit as dt → 0 yields (2) and (3).
6 More precisely, the designer is allowed to randomize over the choice of policy (α, β) (using a relaxed control, as such randomization is defined in optimal control). A corollary of our results is that there is no gain for him from doing so.
from the designer, so they decide based on the prior p 0 . Since p 0 < c, no consumer ever consumes.
• Full Transparency (FT): In this regime, the designer discloses her information, or her beliefs, truthfully to the consumers. In our framework, the full disclosure can be equivalently implemented by the policy of k t ≡ 1, β t ≡ 0 and α t = 1 {pt≥c} .
• First-Best (FB): In this regime, the designer optimizes on her policy, without having to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (5) .
To distinguish the current problem relative to the first-best, we call the optimal policy maximizing W subject to (1), (2) , (4) and (5), the second-best policy.
Before proceeding, we observe that it never pays the designer to lie about the news if they arrive. Lemma 1. It is optimal for the designer to disclose the breakthrough (both good and bad) news immediately. That is, an optimal policy has k t ≡ 1, β t ≡ 0.
Proof. If one raises k t and lowers β t , it can only raise the value of objective W and relax (5) (and do not affect other constraints).
Lemma 1 reduces the scope of optimal intervention by the designer to choosing α, the recommendation policy following "no news." In the sequel, we shall thus fix k t ≡ 1, β t ≡ 0 and focus on α as the sole policy instrument.
Optimal Recommendation Policy
We begin by characterizing further the process by which the designer's posterior, and the agents' beliefs over designer's posterior, evolve under arbitrary policy α. To understand how the designer's posterior evolves, it is convenient to work with the likelihood ratio ℓ t = pt 1−pt of the posterior p t . Given the one-to-one correspondence between the two variables, we shall refer to ℓ simply as a "posterior" when there is little cause for confusion. It then follows that (1) can be restated as:l
where ∆ := λg −λ b λg , assuming for now λ g > 0.
The two other state variables, namely the posteriors g t and b t on the designer's belief, are pinned down by ℓ t (and thus by p t ) at least when λ g = λ b (i.e., when no news is not informationally neutral.) (We shall remark on the case of the neutrality case ∆ = 0.)
This result is remarkable. A priori, there is no reason to expect that the designer's belief p t serves as a "sufficient statistic" for the posteriors that the agents attach to the arrival of news, since different histories for instance involving even different experimentation over time could in principle lead to the same p.
It is instructive to observe how the posterior on the designer's belief evolves. At time zero, there is no possibility of any news arriving, so the posterior on the good and bad news are both zero. As time progresses without any news arriving, the likelihood ratio either falls or rises depending on the sign of ∆. Either way, both posteriors rise. This enables the designer to ask credibly the agents to engage in costly experimentation with an increased probability. To see this specifically, substitute g t and b t into (5) to obtain:
if the normalized cost k := c/(1 − c) exceeds ℓ t andᾱ(ℓ t ) := 1 otherwise.
The next lemma will figure prominently in our characterization of the second-best policy later.
Lemma 3. If ℓ 0 < k and ∆ = 0, thenᾱ(ℓ t ) is zero at t = 0, and increasing in t, strictly so wheneverᾱ(ℓ t ) ∈ [0, 1).
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At time zero, the agents have no incentive for watching the movie since the good news could never have arrived instantaneously, and their prior is unfavorable. Interestingly, the agents can be asked to experiment more over time, even when ∆ > 0, in which case the posterior ℓ t falls over time! If λ g > 0, the agents attach increasingly higher posterior on the arrival of good news as time progresses. The "slack incentives" from the increasingly probable good news can then be shifted to motivate the agents' experimentation when there is no news.
Substituting the posteriors from Lemma 2 into the objective function and using µ t = ρ + α t , and with normalization of the objective function, the second-best program is restated 7 The case ∆ = 0 is similar: the same conclusion holds butᾱ need to be defined separately.
as follows:
[SB] sup
Obviously, the first-best program, labeled [F B], is the same as [SB] , except that the upper bound forᾱ(ℓ t ) is replaced by 1. We next characterize the optimal recommendation policy. The precise characterization depends on the sign of ∆, i.e., whether the environment is that of predominantly good news or bad news.
"Good news" environment: ∆ > 0
In this case, as time progresses with no news, the designer becomes pessimistic about the quality of the good. Nevertheless, as observed earlier, the agents' posterior on the arrival of good news improves. This enables the designer to incentivize the agents to experiment increasingly over time. The designer can accomplish this through a"noisy recommendation"-by recommending agents to watch even when no good news has arrived. Such a policy "pools" recommendation across two very different circumstances; one where the good news has arrived and one where no news has arrived. Although the agents in the latter circumstance will never follow the recommendation wittingly, pooling the two circumstances for recommendation enables the designer to siphon the slack incentives from the former circumstance to the latter, and thus can incentivize the agents to "experiment" for the future generation, so long as the recommendation in the latter circumstance is kept sufficiently infrequent/improbable. Since the agents do not internalize the social benefit of experimentation, the noisy recommendation becomes a useful tool for the designer's second-best policy.
Whether and to what extent the designer will induce such an experimentation depends on the tradeoff between the cost of experimentation for the current generation and the benefit of social learning the experimentation will yield for the future generation of the agents. And this tradeoff depends on the posterior p. To fix the idea, consider the first-best problem and assume ρ = 0, so there is no free learning. Suppose given posterior p, the designer contemplates whether to experiment a little longer or to stop experimentation altogether for good. This is indeed the decision facing the designer given the cutoff decision rule, since intuitively once experimentation becomes undesirable once it will continue to be later with a worsened posterior. If she induces experimentation a little longer, say by dt, the additional experimentation will cost (c − p)dt. But, the additional experimentation may bring a good news in which case the future generation of agents will enjoy the benefit of v := e −rt (1 − c)dt = (1 − c)/r. Since the good news will arrive at the rate λ g dt, but only if the movie is good, the probability of which is the posterior p, the expected benefit from the additional experimentation is vλ g pdt. Hence, the additional experimentation is desirable if and only if
. The same tradeoff would apply to the second-best scenario, except that absent free learning, the designer can never motivate the agents to experiment; that is,ᾱ(p) = 0, so the threshold posterior is irrelevant.
For the general case with free learning ρ > 0, the optimal policy is described as follows.
Proposition 1. The second-best policy prescribes, absent any news, the maximal experimentation at α(p) =ᾱ(p) until the posterior falls to p * g , and no experimentation α(p) = 0 thereafter for p < p * g , where
,
is the continuation payoff upon the arrival of good news. The first-best policy has the same structure with the same threshold posterior, except thatᾱ(p) is replaced by 1. If p 0 ≥ c, then the second-best policy implements the first-best, where neither NSL nor FT can. If p 0 < c, then the second-best induces a slower experimentation/learning than the first-best.
The detailed analysis generating the current characterization (as well as the subsequent ones) is provided in the Appendix. Here we provide some intuition behind the result. With a free learning at rate ρ > 0, stopping experimentation does not mean abandoning all learning. The good news that may be learned from additional experimentation may be also learned in the future for free. One must thus discount the value of learning good news achieved by additional experimentation by the rate at which the same news is learned in the future for free:
. The threshold posterior can be seen to equate this adjusted value of experimentation with its flow cost:
Note the opportunity cost of experimenting is the same for first-best and second-best scenario, since the consequence of stopping the experimentation is the same in both cases. Hence, the first-best policy has the same threshold p * g , but the rate of experimentation is α = 1 when the posterior is above the threshold level. If p 0 ≥ c, then sinceᾱ(p) = 1 for all p, the second-best implements the first-best. Note that the noisy recommendation policy is necessary to attain the first-best. Since p * g < c, the policy calls for experimentation even when it is myopically suboptimal. This means that FT cannot implement the first-best even in this case since under FT agents will stop experimenting before p reaches p * g . Suppose next p 0 ∈ (p * g , c). Then, the second-best cannot implement the first-best. The rate of experimentation, while it is going on, is larger under FB than under SB, so the threshold posterior is reached sooner under FB than under SB, and of course the news arrives sooner, thus enabling the social learning benefit to materialize sooner (both in the sense of stochastic dominance), under FB than under SB. Another difference is that the rate of experimentation at a given posterior p depends on the prior p 0 in the SB (but not in FB). The reason that, for the same posterior p > p Figure 1 plots the time it takes to reach the threshold posterior under FB and SB. Clearly, the experimentation induced under FB is front-loaded and thus monotonic. Interestingly, the experimentation induced by SB is front-loaded but hump-shaped. Closer to the release date, the arrival of good news is very unlikely, so the unfavorable prior means that the agents can hardly be asked to experiment. Consequently, experimentation takes off very slowly under SB. As time progresses, the agents attach increasingly higher probability on the arrival of good news, increasing the margin for the designer to leverage the slack incentives from the good news event to encourage agents to experiment even when no news has arrived. The experimentation rate accordingly picks up and increases, until the posterior falls below p at which point all experimentation stops.
Interestingly, the arrival rate of bad news λ b does not affect the threshold posterior p * g . This is because the tradeoff does not depend on the arrival rate of bad news. But the arrival rate of the bad news does affect both the duration and the rate of incentivecompatible experimentation. As can be seen from (1), as λ b rises (toward λ g ), it slows down the decline of the posterior. Hence, it takes a longer time for the posterior to reach the threshold level, meaning that the agents are induced to experiment longer (until the news arrive or the threshold p * is reached), holding constant the per-period experimentation rate. Meanwhile, the incentive compatible rate of experimentationᾱ(p) increases with λ b , since the commitment never to recommend in the event of bad news means that a recommendation is more likely to have been a result of a good news. Hence, experimentation rises in two different senses when λ b rises.
Next, Proposition 1 also makes the comparison with the other benchmarks clear. First, recall that both NSL and FT involve no experimentation by the agents (i.e., they only differ in that the FT enables social learning once news arrives whereas the NSL does not). By contrast, as long as p 0 ∈ (p * g , c), SB involves nontrivial experimentation, so SB produces strictly more information than either regime, and it enables full social learning when good news arrives. In fact, since FT is a feasible policy option under SB, this suggests that SB strictly dominates FT (which in turn dominates NSL).
"Bad news" environment: ∆ < 0
In this case, the designer grows optimistic over time about the quality of the good when no news arrives. Likewise, the agents also grow optimistic over time from no breakthrough news under FT. In this sense, unlike the good news case, the incentive conflict between the designer and the agents are lessened in this case. The conflict does not disappear altogether, however, since the agents still do not internalize the social benefit from their experimentation. For this reason, the noisy recommendation proves to be valuable to the designer even in this case.
The logic of the optimal recommendation policy is similar to the good news case. Namely, it is optimal for the agents to experiment if and only if the (true) posterior is higher than some threshold (as is shown in the Appendix). This policy entails a different experimentation pattern in terms of time, however; now the experimentation is back-loaded rather than frontloaded (which was the case with good news). This also changes the nature of the learning benefit at the margin, and this difference matters for design of the recommendation policy.
To appreciate this difference, consider the first-best problem in a simplified environment in which there is no free learning (i.e., ρ = 0) and no arrival of good news (i.e., λ g = 0). Suppose as before the designer contemplates whether to engage the agents in experimentation or not, at a given posterior p. If she does not trigger experimentation, there will be no more experimentation in the future (given the structure of the optimal policy), so the payoff is zero. If she does trigger experimentation, likewise, there will continue to be an experimentation unless bad news arrives (in which case the experimentation will be stopped for good). The payoff from such an experimentation consists of two terms:
The first term represents the payoff from consuming the good irrespective of the bad news.
The second term captures the saving of the cost by stopping consumption whenever the bad news arrives. 9 In this simple case, therefore, the first-best policy prescribes full experimentation if and only if this payoff is nonnegative, or p ≥ c 1 −
. This reasoning reveals that the nature of learning benefit is crucially different here. In the good news case, at the margin the default is to stop watching the movie, so the benefit of learning was to trigger (permanent) "consumption of the good movie." By contrast, the benefit of learning here is to trigger (permanent) "avoidance of the bad movie," since at the margin the default is to watch the movie. With free learning ρ > 0 and good news λ g ∈ (0, λ b ), the same learning benefit underpins the tradeoff both in the first-best and second-best policy, but the tradeoff is moderated by two additional effects: (1) free learning introduces opportunity cost of experimentation, which reduces its appeal and thus raises the threshold posterior and time for triggering experimentation; 10 and (2) good news may trigger permanent conversion even during no experimentation phase. The result is presented as follows.
Proposition 2. The first-best policy (absent any news) prescribes no experimentation until the posterior p rises to p * * b , and then full experimentation at the rate of α(p) = 1 thereafter, for p > p * * b , where
The second-best policy implements the first-best if p 0 ≥ c or if . In other words, the second-best policy triggers experimentation at a later date and at a lower rate than does the first-best. 9 The bad news arrives only if the good is bad (whose probability is 1 − p) with (the time discounted) probability
, and once it arrives, there is a permanent cost saving of c/r, hence the second term. 10 Due to free learning, the "no experimentation" phase is never "absorbing." That is, the posterior will continue to rise and eventually pass the critical value, thus triggering the experimentation phase. This feature contrasts with the "breakdowns" case of Keller and Rady (2012).
The proof of the proposition as well as the precise formula forp 0 is in the appendix. Here we provide some explanation for the statement.
The first-best policy calls for the agents to start experimenting strictly before the true posterior rises to c, namely when p * * b < c is reached. Obviously, if p 0 ≥ c, then since the posterior can only rise, absent any news, the posterior under full transparency is always above the cost, so FT is enough to induce the first-best outcome. Recall that FT can never implement first-best even for p 0 ≥ c in the good news case.
If p 0 < c, then the optimal policy cannot be implemented by FT. In order to implement such a policy, the designer must again rely on noisy recommendation, recommending the good even when the good news has not arrived. Unlike the case of ρ > 0, the first-best may be implementable as long as the initial prior p 0 is sufficiently low. In that case, it takes a relatively long time for the posterior to reach p * * b , so by the time the critical posterior is reached, the agents attach a sufficiently high posterior on the arrival of good news that the designer's recommendation becomes credible.
If p 0 ∈ (p 0 , c), then the first-best is not attainable even with the noisy recommendation. In this case, the designer triggers experimentation at a higher posterior and thus at a later date than she does under the first-best policy. This is because the scale of subsequent experimentation is limited by incentive compatibility, which lowers the benefit from triggering experimentation. Since there is less a benefit to be had from triggering experimentation, the longer will the designer hang on to free learning than in first best.
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The comparative statics with respect to parameters such as λ b , r and ρ is immediate from the inspection of the threshold posterior. Its intuition follows also naturally from the reasoning provided before the proposition. The higher λ b and r and the lower ρ are, the higher is the "net" benefit from experimentation, so the designer triggers experimentation sooner.
"Neutral news" environment: ∆ = 0
In this case, the designer's posterior on the quality of the good remains unchanged in the absence of breakthrough news. Experimentation could be still desirable for the designer. If p 0 ≥ c, then the agents will voluntarily consume the good, so experimentation is clearly selfenforcing. If p 0 < c, then the agents will not voluntarily consume, so a noisy recommendation is needed to incentivize experimentation. As before the optimal policy has the familiar cutoff structure.
Proposition 3. The second-best policy prescribes, absent any news, the maximal experimentation at α(p 0 ) =ᾱ(p 0 ) if p 0 < p * 0 , and no experimentation α(ℓ) = 0 if p < p * 0 , where
b . The first-best policy has the same structure with the same threshold posterior, except thatᾱ(p 0 ) is replaced by 1. The first-best is implementable if and only if p 0 ≥ c.
Heterogenous observable costs
While the analysis of the bad and good news case brings out some common features of supervised social learning, such as increasing experimentation early on, as well as delay, one feature that apparently distinguishes the two cases is that the belief level at which experimentation stops in the good news case is the socially optimal one, while -except when first-best is achievable-experimentation starts too late in the bad news case (even in terms of beliefs). Here, we argue that the logic prevailing in the bad news case is the robust one. In particular, a similar phenomenon arises with good news once we abandon the extreme assumption that all regular agents share the same cost level.
To make this point most clearly, consider the case of "pure" good news:
Suppose agents come in two varieties, or types j = L, H. Different types have different costs, with 0 < ℓ 0 < k L < k H , where, as before,
. Hence, we assume that at the start, neither type of agent is willing to buy. The flow mass of agents of type j is denoted q j , with q L + q H = 1.
Furthermore, assume here that the cost is observable to the designer, so that she can condition her recommendation on this cost. This implies that, conditional on her posterior being ℓ t < 1, she can ask an agent of type j to buy with a probability up tō
as per (7). The following proposition elucidates the structure of the optimal policy. As before, we index thresholds by either one or two asterisks, according to whether this threshold pertains to the second-or first-best policy.
Proposition 4. Both the first-best and second-best policies are characterized by a pair of thresholds 0 ≤ ℓ L ≤ ℓ H ≤ ℓ 0 , such that (i) all agents are asked to experiment with maximum probability for ℓ ≥ ℓ H ; (ii) only low cost agents experiment (with maximum probability) for
L , and ℓ * * H ≥ ℓ * H , with a strict inequality whenever ℓ 0 > ℓ * * H .
Not surprisingly, the lower common threshold is the threshold that applies whenever there is only type of agent, namely the low-cost agent. There is no closed-form formula for the upper threshold (although there is one for its limit as r → 0).
More surprising is the fact that, despite experimenting with a lower intensity in the second-best, the designer chooses to call upon high-cost agents to experiment at beliefs below the level at which she would do so in the first-best. She induces them to experiment "more" than they should do, absent the incentive constraint. This is because of the incentive constraint of the low-cost agents: as she cannot call upon them to experiment as much as she would like, she hangs on to the high-cost type longer (i.e., for lower beliefs) than she would otherwise. This is precisely what happened in the bad news case: because agents are only willing to buy with some probability in the second-best, the designer hangs on the "free" experimentation provided by the flow ρ a little longer there as well.
Let us turn to the case of a continuum of costs, to see how the structure generalizes. Agents' costs are uniformly distributed on [0,c],c ≤ 1. The principal chooses a threshold k t ∈ [0,k] (wherek :=c/(1 −c)) such that, when the principal's belief is p t , an agent with k ≤ k t is recommended to buy with probability α t (k) or 1, depending upon whether k ≤ ℓ 0 or not, while agents with higher cost types are recommended not to buy. (When the principal's belief is 1, all types of agents are recommended to buy.) Clearly, k t is decreasing in time. Let t 1 := inf{t : k t = ℓ 0 }. As some agents have arbitrarily low cost levels, we may set ρ = 0.
The optimal policy can be studied via optimal control. Appendix 6 provides the details for the second-best (the first-best being a simpler case in whichā = 1). Figure 2 illustrates the main conclusions for some choice of parameters. As time passes, ℓ and the upper threshold of the designer k decrease. At some time (t 1 ), k hits ℓ 0 (here, for ℓ ≃ .4). For lower beliefs, the principal's threshold coincides with the first-best. Before that time, however, the threshold that he picks lies above the first-best threshold for this belief; for these parameters, the designer encourages all types to buy (possibly with some very small probability) when the initial belief is high enough (for ℓ above .9). Although all types are solicited, the resulting amount of experimentation is small early on, because types above l 0 are not willing to buy with high probability. As a result, the amount of experimentation is not monotonic: it first increases, and then decreases. The dotdashed line in Figure 2 represents the total amount of experimentation: it is below the first-best amount, as a function of the belief, until time t 1 .
Endogenous entry
We now consider the case in which agents can decide when to get a recommendation. Agents arrive at a unit flow rate over time, and an agent arriving at time t can choose to get a recommendation at any date τ ≥ t (possibly, τ = +∞). Of course, if agents could "continuously" get recommendations for free until they decide to purchase, if ever, it would be weakly dominant to do so. Here instead, we assume that it is sufficiently costly to get a recommendation that agents get only one, although we will ignore the cost from actually getting a recommendation. Given this, there is no benefit in delaying the decision to buy or not beyond that time. Hence, an agent born at time t chooses a stopping time τ ≥ t at which to get a recommendation ("checking in"), as well as a decision to buy at that time, as a function of the recommendation he gets. Between the time the agent is born and the time he checks is, he receives no information. Agents share the designer's discount rate r.
We restrict attention to the case of "pure" good news: λ = λ g > 0 = λ b . All agents share the same cost c > p 0 of buying. Recommendations α are a function of time and the designer's belief, as before (they cannot be conditioned on a particular agent's age, assumed to be private information).
Hence, an agent maximizes the payoff
Substituting k, ℓ 0 and ℓ, this is equivalent to maximizing
Suppose first full transparency, that is, α ≡ 0, and so U t = e −rt (ℓ 0 − ℓ t ). Note that the timing at which agents check in is irrelevant for belief updating (because those who check in never experiment), so that
The function U t is quasi concave in t, with a maximum achieved at the time
The optimal strategy of the agents is then intuitive: an agent born before t * waits until time t * , trading off the benefits from a more informed decision with his impatience; an agent arriving at a later time checks in immediately. Perhaps surprisingly, the cost c is irrelevant for this decision: as the agent only buys if he finds out that the posterior is high, the surplus (1 − c) only scales his utility, without affecting his preferred timing.
Note that
so that in fact his utility is only a function of his prior and the ratio r ρλ
. In fact, ρ plays two roles: by increasing the rate at which learning occurs, it is equivalent to lower discounting (hence the appearance of r/ρ); in addition, it provides an alternative and cheaper way of learning to the agents consuming (holding fixed the total "capacity" of experimentation). To disentangle these two effects, we hold fixed the ratio r λρ in what follows.
As a result of this waiting by agents that arrive early, a queue Q t of agents forms, which grows over time, until t * at which it gets resorbed. That is,
with the convention that Q is a right-continuous process.
To build our intuition about the designer's problem, consider first the first-best problem. Suppose that the designer can decide when agents check in, and whether they buy or not. However, we assume that the timing decision cannot be made contingent on the actual posterior belief, as this is information that the agents do not possess. Plainly, there is no point in asking an agent to wait if he were to be instructed to buy independently of the posterior once he checks in. Agents that experiment do not wait. Conversely, an agent that is asked to wait -and so does not buy if the posterior is low once he checks in-exerts no externality on other agents, and the benevolent designer might as well instruct him to check in at the agent's favorite time.
It follows that the optimal policy of the (unconstrained) designer must involve two times, 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 , such that agents that arrive before time t 1 are asked to experiment; agents arriving later only buy if the posterior is one, with agents arriving in the interval (t 1 , t 2 ] waiting until time t 2 to check in, while later agents check in immediately. Full transparency is the special case t 1 = 0, as then it is optimal to set t 2 = t * .
It is then natural to ask: is full transparency ever optimal?
Proposition 5. Holding fixed the ratio r λρ
, there exists 0 ≤ ρ 1 ≤ ρ 2 (finite) such that it is optimal to set
Hence, for ρ sufficiently large, it is optimal for the designer to use full transparency even in the absence of incentive constraints. Naturally, this implies that the same holds once such constraints are added.
Next, we ask, does it ever pay the incentive-constrained designer to use another policy?
Proposition 6. The second-best policy is different from full transparency if
Note that the right-hand side is always positive if k is sufficiently close to ℓ 0 . On the other hand, the right-hand side is negative for k large enough. While this condition is not tight, this comparative static is intuitive. If ρ or k is large enough, full transparency is very attractive: If ρ is large, "free" background learning occurs fast, so that there is no point in having agents experiment; if k is large, taking the chance of having agent make the wrong choice by recommending them to buy despite persistent uncertainty is very costly. To summarize: For some parameters, the designer's best choice consists in full transparency (when the cost is high, for instance, or when learning for "free" via ρ is scarce). Indeed, this would also be the first-best in some cases. For other parameters, she can do better than full transparency.
What is the structure of the optimal policy in such cases? This is illustrated in Figure 3 . There is an initial phase in which the designer deters experimentation by recommending the good with a probability that is sufficiently high. In fact, given that agents would possibly be willing to wait initially even under full transparency, the designer might be able to do just that at the very beginning.
At some time t, all customers that have been waiting "check in" and are told to buy with some probability -unless of course a breakthrough has obtained by then. It is optimal for them to all check in at that very time, yet it is also optimal to experiment with them Figure 3 : The probability of a recommendation as a function of ℓ (here, (r, λ, ρ, k, ℓ 0 ) = (1/2, 2, 1/5, 15, 9)).
sequentially, increasing continuously the probability with which they are recommended to buy as the belief ℓ decreases, in a way that leaves them indifferent across this menu of (ℓ, α) offered sequentially at that instant.
12 The atom of customers is "split" at that instant, and the locus of (ℓ, α) that is visited is represented by the locus (l,α), which starts at a belief ℓ 1 that is the result of the background experimentation only, and ends at ℓ 2 at which point all agents that have been waiting have checked in.
The locusᾱ(ℓ) represents the locus of possible values (ℓ 2 , α 2 ) that are candidate values for the beginning of the continuation path once no agents are left in the queue; 13 in particular, full transparency is the special case in which α 2 = 0 (in which case α 1 = 0 as well). From that point on, experimentation tapers off continuously, with agents buying with probability α(ℓ) as time goes on (see locus (ℓ, α(ℓ)) in Figure 3) . Eventually, at some time T and belief ℓ T , the probability α(ℓ) that keeps them indifferent hits zero -full transparency prevails from this point on.
The condition of Proposition 5 is not tight, but an exact characterization of the parameters under which full transparency is optimal appears elusive.
12 Doing so sequentially is optimal because it increases the overall experimentation that can be performed with them; we can think of this outcome as the supremum over policies in which, at each time t, the designer can only provide one recommendation, although formally this is a well-defined maximum if the optimal control problem is written with ℓ as the "time" index.
13 This locus of "candidate" values solves a simple optimization program, see the authors for detail. It is downward sloping and starts at the full transparency optimum, i.e.,ᾱ(ℓ * ) = 0.
Unobserved Costs
An important feature that has been missing so far from the analysis is private information regarding preferences, that is, in the opportunity cost of consuming the good. Section 3.4 made the strong assumption that the designer can condition on the agents' preferences. Perhaps this is an accurate description for some markets, such as Netflix, where the designer has already inferred substantial information about the agents' preferences from past choices. But it is also easy to think of cases where this is not so. Suppose that, conditional on the posterior being 1, the principal recommends to buy with probability γ t (it is no longer obvious here that it is equal to 1). Then, conditional on hearing "buy," an agent buys if and only if
or equivalently
In particular, if c < p t , he always buys, while if c ≥ p 0 , he never does. There is another type of possible randomization: when the posterior is 1, he recommends buying, while he recommends buying with probability α t (as before) when the posterior is p t < p 0 . Then types for whom
buy, while others do not. Note that, defining γ t := 1/α t for such a strategy, the condition is the same as above, but of course now γ t ≥ 1.
Or the principal might do both types of randomizations at once: conditional on the posterior is 1, the principal recommends B ("buy") with probability γ, while he recommends B with probability α conditional on the posterior being p t . We let N denote the set of cost types that buy even if recommended N ("not buy" which we take wlog to be the message that induces the lower posterior), and B the set of types that buy if recommended B.
A consumer with cost type k j buys after a B recommendation if and only if
On the other hand, a N recommendation leads to buy if
To gain some intuition, let us start with finitely many costs. Let us define Q B , C B the quantity and cost of experimentation for those who only buy if the recommendation is B, and we write Q N , C N for the corresponding variables for those who buy in any event.
We can no longer define V (ℓ) to be the payoff conditional on the posterior being ℓ: after all, what happens when the posterior is 1 matters for payoffs. So hereafter V (ℓ) refers to the expected payoff when the low posterior (if it is low) is ℓ. We have that
where we have mixed p and ℓ. Rewriting, this gives
Assuming -as always-that there is some free learning, we have that rV (ℓ) → ℓ(1−c)/(1+ℓ), where c is the average cost.
It is more convenient to work with the thresholds. The principal chooses two thresholds: the lower one, k L is such that all cost types below buy independently of the recommendation. The higher one, k H , is such that types strictly above k L but no larger than k H buy only if there is a good recommendation. Solving, we get
and not surprisingly k H ≥ k L if and only if β ≥ α. In terms of k H , k L , the problem becomes
or rather, it is the maximum of the right-hand side subject to the constraints on k L , k H . While the interpretation of these formulas is straightforward, they are not so convenient, so we now turn to the case of uniformly distributed costs, with distribution [0,c]. Note that our derivation so far applies just as well, replacing sums with integrals. We dropc from the equations that follows, reasoning per consumer. Computing these quantities and costs by integration, we obtain upon simplification
or, defining
we have that
Note that x is increasing in α and decreasing in γ, 14 and so it is maximum when α = γ, in which case it is simply ℓ 0 1+ℓ 0 , and minimum when γ = 1, α = 0, in which case it is ℓ 1+ℓ . Note also that V must be decreasing in ℓ, as it is the expected value, not the conditional value, so that a higher ℓ means more uncertainty (formally, this follows from the principle of optimality, and the fact that a strategy available at a lower ℓ is also available at a higher ℓ). Because the right-hand side is linear in x, the solution is extremal, unless rV (ℓ) = ℓ 0 2(1+ℓ 0 ) , but then V ′ = 0 and so x cannot be interior (over an interval of time) after all. We have two cases to consider,
In that case, the derivative with respect to x of the right-hand side must be positive, which gives us as condition
The left-hand side being increasing, this condition is satisfied for a lower interval of values 14 Although it is intuitive, this is not meant to be immediate, but it follows upon differentiation of the formula for x. of ℓ: Therefore, if the policy α = γ is optimal at some t, it is optimal for all later times (lower values of ℓ). In that case, however, we must have C 1 = 0, as V must be bounded. The payoff would then be constant and equal to
Such complete pooling is never optimal, as we shall see. Indeed, if no information is ever revealed, the payoff is
, the solution is a little more unusual, and involves the exponential integral function E n (z) := ∞ 1 e −zt t n dt. Namely, we have
In that case, the derivative with respect to x of the right-hand side must be negative, which gives us as condition
Note that the right hand side is also positive. Considering the value function, it holds that : by that time, the state will be revealed, and with this policy (α, γ) = (0, 1), the payoff will be either 0 (if the state is bad) or 1/2 (one minus the average cost) if the state is good, an event whose prior probability is p 0 = ℓ 0 /(1 + ℓ 0 ).
We note that
The function r → re To summarize: if the policy x = ℓ 0 /(1 + ℓ 0 ) is ever taken, it is taken at all later times, but it cannot be taken throughout, because taking x = ℓ/(1 + ℓ) throughout yields a higher payoff. The last possibility is an initial phase of x = ℓ/(1 + ℓ), followed by a switch at some time x = ℓ 0 /(1 + ℓ 0 ), with continuation value V P . To put it differently, we would need V = V P on [0,l] for somel, and V (ℓ) = V S (ℓ; C 2 ) on [l, ℓ 0 ], for some C 2 . But then it had better be the case that V S (ℓ; C 2 ) ≥ V P on that higher interval, and so there would exist 0 < ℓ < ℓ ′ < ℓ 0 with
, so that V must be increasing over some interval of ℓ, which violates V being decreasing.
To conclude: if costs are not observed, and the principal uses a deterministic policy in terms of the amount of experimentation, he can do no better than to disclose the posterior honestly, at all times. This does not mean that he is useless, as he makes the information public, but he does not induce any more experimentation than the myopic quantity.
Proposition 7. With uniformly distributed costs that are agents' private information, full transparency is optimal.
To be clear, we allow the designer to randomize over paths of recommendation, "flipping a coin" at time 0, unbeknownst to the agents, and deciding on a particular function (α t ) t as a function of the outcome of this randomization. Such "chattering" controls can sometimes be useful, and one might wonder whether introducing these would overturn this last proposition. In appendix, we show that this is not the case.
[6] Ely, J., A. Frankel and E. Kamenica, 2013. "Suspense and Surprise," mimeo, University of Chicago.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Let κ t := p 0 /(p 0 − g t ). Note that κ t = 1. Then, it follows from (2) and (4) thatκ
Dividing both sides of (11) by the respective sides of (6), we get,
It follows that, given the initial condition,
We can then unpack κ t to recover g t , and from this we can obtain b t via (4).
Proof of Lemma 3. We shall focus on
Recallᾱ(ℓ) = min{1,α(ℓ)}. Since ℓ t falls over t when ∆ > 0 and rises over t when ∆ < 0. It suffices to show thatα(·) is decreasing when ∆ > 0 and increasing when ∆ < 0.
We make several preliminary observations. First,α(ℓ) ∈ 0, 1) if and only if
Second,α
where
on any range of ℓ over whichᾱ ≤ 1.
Consider next ∆ > 0. In this case, the relevant interval is ℓ ∈ [0, ℓ 0 ]. It follows from (14) that ifα
. It follows thatᾱ = 1 is on some interval [0, ℓ 1 ] and positive and decreasing (< 1) over (ℓ 1 , ℓ 0 ], for some ℓ 1 ∈ (0, ℓ 0 ).
Proof of Proposition 1.
To analyze this tradeoff precisely, we reformulate the designer's problem to conform to the standard optimal control problem framework. First, we switch the roles of variables so that we treat ℓ as a "time" variable and t(ℓ) := inf{t|ℓ t ≤ ℓ} as the state variable, interpreted as the time it takes for a posterior ℓ to be reached. Up the constant (additive and multiplicative) terms, the designer's problem is written as: For problem i = SB, F B, This transformation enables us to focus on the optimal recommendation policy directly as a function of the posterior ℓ. Given the transformation, the admissible set no longer depends on the state variable (since ℓ is no longer a state variable), thus conforming to the standard specification of the optimal control problem.
Next, we focus on u(ℓ) :=
as the control variable. With this change of variable, the designer's problem (both second-best and first-best) is restated, up to constant (additive and multiplicative) terms: For i = SB, F B,
where the admissible set for the control is U SB (ℓ) := [
] for the second-best problem and
]. With this transformation, the problem becomes a standard linear optimal control problem (with state t and control α). A solution exists by the Filippov-Cesari theorem (Cesari, 1983) .
We shall thus focus on the necessary condition for optimality to characterize the optimal recommendation policy. To this end, we write the Hamiltonian:
The necessary optimality conditions state that there exists an absolutely continuous function
Finally, transversality at ℓ = 0 (t(ℓ) is free) implies that ν(0) = 0.
or using the formulas for t ′ and ν ′ ,
so φ cannot be identically zero over some interval, as there is at most one value of ℓ for which φ ′ (ℓ) = 0. Every solution must be "bang-bang." Specifically, φ ′ (ℓ) > 0 is equivalent to
Also, φ(0) ≤ 0 (specifically, φ(0) = 0 for ∆ < 1 and φ(0) = −∆λ g e −rt(ℓ) ρk for ∆ = 1). So φ(ℓ) < 0 for all 0 < ℓ < ℓ * g , for some threshold ℓ * g > 0, and φ(ℓ) > 0 for ℓ > ℓ * g . The constraint u(ℓ) ∈ U i (ℓ) must bind for all ℓ ∈ [0, ℓ * ) (a.e.), and every optimal policy must switch from u(ℓ) = 1/ρ for ℓ < ℓ * g to 1/(ρ + α(ℓ)) in the second-best problem and to 1/(ρ + 1) in the first-best problem for ℓ > ℓ * g . It remains to determine the switching point ℓ * (and establish uniqueness in the process).
for some constants C 1 , C 0 = − 1 r ln C 1 . Note that C 1 > 0 as otherwise t(ℓ) = ∞ for ℓ ∈ (0, ℓ * g ), which is inconsistent with t(ℓ * g ) < ∞. Hence,
and so (using ν(0) = 0),
We now see that the switching point is uniquely determined by φ(ℓ) = 0, as φ is continuous and C 1 cancels. Simplifying,
which leads to the formula for p * g in the Proposition (via ℓ = p/(1 − p) and k = c/(1 − c)). We have identified the unique solution to the program for both first-and second-best, and shown in the process that the optimal threshold p * applies to both problems.
The second-best implements the first-best if p 0 ≥ c, since thenᾱ(ℓ) = 1 for all ℓ ≤ ℓ 0 . If not, thenᾱ(ℓ) < 1 for a positive measure of ℓ ≤ ℓ 0 . Hence, the second-best implements a lower and thus a slower experimentation than does the first-best.
As for sufficiency, we use Arrow sufficiency theorem (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987, Theorem 5, p.107). Note that, for all u ∈ U i , i = F B, SB,
Hence, given (15), the maximized HamiltonianĤ(t, ℓ, ν(ℓ)) = max u∈U i (ℓ) H(t, u, ℓ, ν(ℓ)) is necessarily concave in t, for all ℓ, implying the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. The same steps must be applied to the case ∆ < 0. The same change of variable produces the following program for the designer: For problem i = SB, F B,
where as before
]. We pause and note that, for all u(ℓ) ∈ U i (ℓ), i = F B, SB,
so that, as in the case ∆ < 0, the maximized Hamiltonian will necessarily be concave in t, which will imply optimality of our candidate solution, by Arrow's sufficiency theorem.
We now turn to the necessary conditions. As before, the necessary conditions for the second-best policy now state that there exists an absolutely continuous function ν : [0, ℓ 0 ] such that, for all ℓ, either
or else u(ℓ) = Since ψ(ℓ) = −φ(ℓ), we get from (19) that
k, namely the solution to ψ(ℓ) = 0. Then, ψ is maximized at ℓ, and is strictly quasi-concave. Since lim ℓ→∞ h(ℓ) = 0, this means that there must be a cutoff ℓ * b <l such that ψ(ℓ) < 0 for ℓ < ℓ * b and ψ(ℓ) > 0 for ℓ > ℓ * b . Hence, the solution is bang-bang, with u(ℓ) = 1/ρ if ℓ < ℓ * b , and u(ℓ) = 1/(ρ + α(ℓ)) if ℓ > ℓ * b . The first-best policy has the same cutoff structure, except that the cutoff may be different from ℓ * b . Let ℓ * * b denote the first-best cutoff.
First-best policy: We shall first consider the first best policy. In that case, for ℓ > ℓ * * b ,
and lim ℓ→∞ ν(ℓ) = 0 give
So we get, for ℓ > ℓ * * b ,
Second-best policy. We now characterize the second-best cutoff. There are two cases, depending upon whether α(ℓ) = 1 is incentive-feasible at the threshold ℓ * * b that characterizes the first-best policy. In other words, for the first-best to be implementable, we should havē α(ℓ * * ) = 1, which requires
Observe that since ∆ < 0,l 0 < ℓ * * . If ℓ 0 ≤l 0 , then the designer begins with no experimentation and waits until the posterior belief improves sufficiently to reach ℓ * * , at which point the agents will be asked to experiment with full force, i.e., withᾱ(ℓ) = 1, that is, given that no news has arrived by that time. This first-best policy is implementable since, given the sufficiently favorable prior, the designer will have built sufficient "credibility" by that time. Hence, unlike the case of ∆ > 0, the first best can be implementable even when ℓ 0 < k.
Suppose ℓ 0 <l 0 . Then, the first-best is not implementable. That is,ᾱ(ℓ * *
denote the threshold at which the constrained designer switches toᾱ(ℓ). We now prove that ℓ * b > ℓ * * b . For the sake of contradiction, suppose that ℓ * b ≤ ℓ * * b . Note that ψ(x) = lim ℓ→∞ φ(ℓ) = 0. This means that
where ψ ′ (ℓ) = −φ ′ (ℓ) is derived using the formula in (19).
Let t * * denote the time at which ℓ * * b is reached along the first-best path. Let
We then have
(because ℓ * b ≤ ℓ * * b ; note that f (ℓ) ≤ 0 if and only if ℓ >l, so h must tend to 0 as ℓ → ∞ from above), yet
Multiplying e rt * * (l) on both sides of (20) gives
Likewise, multiplying e rt(l) on both sides of (21) gives
Subtracting (22) from (23) gives
Note t ′ (ℓ) ≥ (t * * ) ′ (ℓ) > 0 for all ℓ, with strict inequality for a positive measure of ℓ. This means that e −r(t(ℓ)−t(l)) ≤ e −r(t * * (ℓ)−t * * (l)) if ℓ >l, and e −r(t(ℓ)−t(l)) ≥ e −r(t * * (ℓ)−t * * (l)) if ℓ <l, again with strict inequality for a positive measure of ℓ for ℓ ≥ ℓ * * b (due to the fact that the first best is not implementable; i.e.,ᾱ(ℓ * * b ) < 1). Since f (ℓ) < 0 if ℓ >l and f (ℓ) > 0 if ℓ <l, we have a contradiction to (24).
Proof of Proposition 3. In that case, ℓ = ℓ 0 . The objective rewrites
and so we see that it is best to set g t to its maximum or minimum value depending on the sign of (ℓ 0 − k)(r + λ g ρ) + λ g ℓ 0 , specifically, depending on
which is the relationship that defines ℓ * g = ℓ * * b . Now, g t is maximized by setting α τ =ᾱ τ and minimized by setting α τ = 0 (for all τ < t).
We can solve for α from the incentive compatibility constraint, plug back into the differential equation for g t and get, by solving the ode,
and finally
which is increasing in t and convex in t (for k > l 0 ) and equal to 1 when
The optimal policy in that case is fairly obvious: experiment at maximum rate until t * , at rate 1 from that point on (conditional on no feedback).
Proof of Proposition 4. The objective function reads
Substituting for g t , b t and re-arranging, this gives
As before, it is more convenient to work with t(ℓ) as the state variable, and doing the change of variables gives
where for j = L, H, x j (ℓ) := 1 − c j 1 +
, and u j (ℓ) :=
are the control variables that take values in the sets U j (ℓ) = [u k ,ū k ] (whose definition depends on first-vs. second-best). This is to be maximized subject to
As before, we invoke Pontryagin's principle. There exists an absolutely continuous function
and u j is maximum or minimum, depending on the sign of
This is because this expression cannot be zero except for a specific value of ℓ = ℓ j . Namely, note first that, because x H (ℓ) < x L (ℓ) for all ℓ, at least one of u L (ℓ), u H (ℓ) must be extremal, for all ℓ. Second, upon differentiation,
implies that, if φ H (ℓ) = 0 were identically zero over some interval, then u L (ℓ) would be extremal over this range, yielding a contradiction, as the right-hand side cannot be zero identically, for u L (ℓ) =ū L (ℓ). Similar reasoning applies to u L (ℓ), considering φ ′ L (ℓ). Hence, the optimal policy is characterized by two thresholds, ℓ H , ℓ L , with ℓ 0 ≥ ℓ H ≥ ℓ L ≥ 0, such that both types of regular consumers are asked to experiment whenever ℓ ∈ [ℓ H , ℓ 0 ], low-cost consumers are asked to do so whenever ℓ ∈ [ℓ L , ℓ 0 ], and neither is asked to otherwise. By the principle of optimality, the threshold ℓ L must coincide with ℓ * g = ℓ * * g in the case of only one type of regular consumers (with cost c L ). To compare ℓ * H and ℓ * * H , we proceed as as in the bad news case, by noting that, in either case,
holds both for the first-and second-best. Note now that, in the range
and it then follows that ℓ * H < ℓ * * H .
Second-best analysis with a continuum of observable costs. We characterize the recommendation policy as r → 0. To derive this policy, let us first describe the designer's payoff. This is his payoff in expectation. Her objective is
To understand this expression, consider t < t 1 . Types in t ∈ (ℓ 0 , k t ) derive no surplus, because they are indifferent between buying or not (what they gain from being recommended to buy when the good has turned out to be good is exactly offset by the cost of doing so when this is myopically suboptimal). Hence, their contribution to the expected payoff cancels out (but it does not mean that they are disregarded, because their behavior affects the amount of experimentation.) Types above k t get recommended to buy only if the good has turned out to be good, in which case they get a flow surplus of λ · 1 − c = 1 − c. Types below ℓ 0 have to purchase for both possible posterior beliefs, and while the flow revenue is 1 in one case, it is only p t = ℓ t /(1 + ℓ t ) in the other case.
The payoff in case t ≥ t 1 can be understood similarly. There are no longer indifferent types. In case of an earlier success, all types enjoy their flow payoff 1 − c, while in case of no success, types below k t still get their flow p t − c.
This expression can be simplified to
with the obvious interpretation. For t ≥ t 1 ,
while for t ≤ t 1 , it holds thaṫ
Finally, note that the value of k 0 is free.
To solve this problem, we apply Pontryagin's maximum principle. Consider first the case t ≥ t 1 . The Hamiltonian is then
where µ is the co-state variable. The maximum principle gives, taking derivatives with respect to the control k t ,
The adjoint equation states thaṫ
after inserting the value for µ t . Differentiate the formula for µ, combine to get a differential equation for k t . Letting r → 0, and changing variables to k(ℓ), we finally obtain
Along with k(0) = 0, k > 0 we get
This gives us, in particular, k(l 0 ). Note that, in terms of cost c, this gives
We now turn to the Hamiltonian for the case t ≤ t 1 , or k t ≥ ℓ 0 . It might be that the solution is a "corner" solution, that is, all agents experiment (k t =k). Hence, we abuse notation, and solve for the unconstrained solution k: the actual solution should be set at min{k, k t }. Proceeding in the same fashion, we get again
and continuity of µ (which follows from the maximum principle) is thus equivalent to the values of k(ℓ) obtained from both cases matching at ℓ = ℓ 0 . The resulting differential equation for k(ℓ) admits no closed-form solution. It is given by
Proof of Proposition 5. Let us start with the designer's payoff, as a function of (t 1 , t 2 ):
The first line corresponds to the utility garnered by agents arriving up to t 1 , who experiment immediately. The second line is the payoff beyond time t 1 in case the posterior is 1 by then; there are two terms, corresponding to those agents that wait until time t 2 , and those that arrive afterwards. Finally, the third line gathers the corresponding terms for the case in which the posterior is p t 1 < 1 at time t 1 . Recall that the belief followṡ
We let
, both in the unit interval. We will hold δ fixed (that is, varying ρ will be done for fixed δ).
A first possibility is to set t 2 = t 1 . (Clearly, setting t 2 = +∞ is suboptimal.) This cannot be optimal if t 1 = 0, however, as the designer could replicate the outcome from full transparency and do better. Inserting t 2 = 0 and solving for the optimal t 1 , we get
(a global maximum), but then evaluating the first derivative of the payoff w.r.t. t 2 at t 2 = t 1 gives a first derivative of 0 and a second derivative whose sign is negative if and only if
If ρ > ρ L , it means that t 2 > t 1 would increase the payoff, given t 1 , a contradiction. If ρ < ρ L , we also need that t 1 > 0, that is, ρ <
, but this is easily seen to be implied by ρ < ρ L . The payoff from this policy involving Learning is (k times)
Note that W L is decreasing then increasing in ρ, with a minimum at ρ
The second alternative is transparency (or Delay), that is, t 1 = 0. The maximum payoff is then (k times)
Note that W D is independent of ρ. Clearly, W L > W D for ρ sufficiently close to 0, and it is readily checked that the inequality is reversed at ρ = ρ * .
Finally, the designer might want to choose 0 < t 1 < t 2 . To solve this problem, we may equivalently maximize the payoff with respect to x 1 , x 2 , where
, and x 2 = e r(t 2 −t 1 ) . It holds that t 1 > 0 if and only if x 1 < δ
Computing the payoff explicitly, taking first-order conditions with respect to x 2 , we may solve for
Plugging into the derivative of the payoff with respect to x 1 gives an expression proportional to
By elementary algebra, this equation admits a root x 1 < δ
where W = W 0 is the main branch of the Lambert function. It is easy to check that ρ LD ≤ ρ * for all ψ, δ. In this case, the root is given by
In that case, the designer's strategy involves both learning and delay, and the payoff is given by (k times)
Note that (recall that δ is fixed)
Hence if ψ > (1 − δ)e δ , the first policy is optimal for small enough ρ. Also, full transparency is necessarily optimal for ρ > ρ * . It is then a matter of tedious algebra to show that W LD is decreasing in ρ, and can only cross
To summarize, we have 0 ≤ ρ LD ≤ ρ * . In addition, because W LD is decreasing and can only cross W L from below, while W D is independent of ρ, the "ranking" can only be,
for intermediate values of ρ, and W = W D for ρ above some upper threshold. We also have that this upper threshold is at most ρ LD -so that full transparency is indeed optimal for high ρ-, while the lower threshold is strictly positive if and only ψ > (1 − δ)e δ .
Proof of Proposition 6. This is a perturbation argument around full transparency. Starting from this policy, consider the following modification. At some time t 2 (belief ℓ 2 ), the designer is fully transparent (α 2 = 0). An instant ∆ > 0 before, however, he recommends to buy with probability α 1 to some fraction κ of the queue Q t 1 = t 1 , so that the agent is indifferent between checking in and waiting until time t 2 = t 1 + ∆:
and
We solve (26) for κ (given ℓ 2 ), and insert into the payoff from this policy:
Transparency is the special case κ = ∆ = 0, t 1 = t * , and we compute a Taylor expansion of the gain for small enough ∆ with ℓ 1 = ℓ * + τ ∆ and α 1 = a 1 ∆ 2 , with τ, a 1 to be chosen. We pick a 1 so that κ = 1, which gives
2ρ(k(λρ + r) − ℓ 0 r) − 2ℓ 0 r ln r r+λρ , and choose τ to maximize the first-order term from the expansion, namely, we set
Plugging back into the expansion, we obtain Randomized policies with unobserved cost. Here, we prove the following proposition, which generalizes Proposition 7 to the case of randomized policies.
Proposition 8. With uniformly distributed unobserved cost, the optimal policy is deterministic. It requires full disclosure of the posterior belief.
We allow the principal to randomize over finitely many paths of experimentation, so there are finitely many possible posterior beliefs, 1, p j , j = 1, . . . , J. We allow then for multiple (finitely many) recommendations R. So a policy is now a collection (α R j , γ R j ) j , depending on the path j that is followed. Along the path j, conditional on the posterior being 1, a recommendation R is given by probability γ R j , and conditional on the posterior being p j , the probabilities α R j are used. One last parameter is the probability with which each path j is being used, µ j .
Correspondingly, there are as many thresholds k R as recommendations; namely, given recommendation R, a consumer buys if his cost is no larger than We shall do a few manipulations. First, we work on the flow payoff. From the first to the second equation, we gather terms involving the revenue ("p j " and 1) on one hand, and cost ("x") on the other. From the second to the third, we use the definition of k R (in particular, note that the term in the numerator of k R appears in the expressions). The last line uses the remark above. where we define
Let us now simplify the coefficient of the partial derivative
To conclude, given (µ j ) (ultimately, a choice variable as well), the optimality equality simplifies to where (x j ) j must be feasible, i.e. appropriate values for (α, γ) must exist. This is a tricky restriction, and the resulting set of (x j ) is convex, but not necessarily a polytope. In particular, it is not the product of the possible quantities of experimentation that would obtain if the agents knew which path were followed, × j ℓ j 1+ℓ j , ℓ 0 1+ℓ 0 . It is a strictly larger set: by blurring recommendation policies, he can obtain pairs of amounts of experimentation outside this set, although not more or less in all dimensions simultaneously.
Let us refer to this set as B J . This set is of independent interest, as it is the relevant set of possible experimentation schemes independently of the designer's objective function. This set is difficult to compute, as for a given J, we must determine what values of x can be obtained for some number of recommendations. Even in the case J = 2, this requires S minimizes x 2 over B 2 ; the second comes from the other boundary line of B 2 at x S .) Given that the result is already known for J = 1, we already know that this is true for the special cases ∂x j = 0, ∂x −j ≥ 0. It remains to verify that this holds when
i.e. we must verify that, for all ℓ 1 ≥ ℓ 2 ,
or rearranging, To conclude, starting from ℓ 1 = ℓ 2 = ℓ 0 , the value of µ is irrelevant: the optimal strategy ensures that the posterior beliefs satisfy ℓ 1 = ℓ 2 . Hence, the principal does not randomize.
The argument for a general J is similar. Fix ℓ 0 ≥ ℓ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ ℓ J . We argue below below that, at x S , all possible variations must satisfy, for all j ′ = 1, . . . , J,
It follows that we have
by monotonicity of the map To conclude, we argue that, from x S , all variations in B J must satisfy, for all j ′ , J j=j ′ µ j (1 + ℓ j )∂x j ≥ 0.
In fact, we show that all elements of B satisfy
and the result will follow from the fact that all these inequalities trivially bind at x S . Consider the case j ′ = 1, the modification for the general case is indicated below. To minimize J j=1 µ j (1 + ℓ j )x j , over B J , it is best, from the formula for x j (or rather, k R that are involved), to set γ R ′ = 1 for some R ′ for which α R ′ j = 0, all j. (To put it differently, to minimize the amount of experimentation conditional on the low posterior, it is best to disclose when the posterior belief is one.) It follows that
The same argument generalizes to other values of j ′ . To minimize the corresponding sum, it is best to disclose the posterior beliefs that are above (i.e., reveal if the movie is good, or if the chosen j is below j ′ ), and the same argument applies, with the sum running over the relevant subset of states.
